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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Case No. 920646-CA
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE
GROUP,
Priority 16
Defendant and Appellee.

JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final order pursuant to Rule 3
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The Court of Appeals

has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), as
amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court err in granting Liberty Mutual
Insurance Groups ("Liberty") Motion for Summary Judgment and
denying Allstate Insurance Company's ("Allstate")

Cross-Motion

for Summary Judgment?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Because summary judgment by definition does not
resolve factual issues, a challenge to summary judgment presents
for review only questions of law.

[The Court reviews] those

conclusions for correctness, according no particular deference to

jr.jockey.apeIbref.joc
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the trial court."

Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v, Dixie Power

& Water, Inc.. 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature Of The Case.
This is a declaratory judgment action to determine
coverage under two insurance policies, one issued by Liberty and
one issued by Allstate.
B. The Course Of Proceedings.
On January 20, 1989, Allstate filed its Complaint.
R. 2-6.

The Complaint named Liberty and Travelers Insurance Co.

Subsequently, Allstate voluntarily dismissed its claim against
Travelers Insurance Co.

R. 134-37.

From January 20, 1989 to

August 6, 1990, certain discovery was conducted.

On August 6,

1990, Liberty filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

R. 31-32.

Subsequently, Liberty and Allstate informally agreed to postpone
further briefing of the motion so Allstate could conduct
additional discovery.

Further discovery was conducted and on

June 7, 1991, Allstate filed its written opposition to Liberty's
motion, a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and a motion to
strike limited portions of two affidavits supporting Liberty's
motion.

R. 82-131.

C. Disposition In The Court Below.
On May 11, 1992, argument on the motions for summary
judgment was heard by the Third District Court, the Honorable
John A. Rokich presiding.

R. 177. On June 18, 1992, the trial

court entered an Order granting Liberty's Motion for Summary
jr.jockey.apelbref.joc
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Judgment, denying Allstate's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
and granting Allstate's motion to strike.

R. 182-84.

Allstate

appeals only the trial court's Order granting Liberty's motion
and denying Allstate's cross-motion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 4, 1985, an automobile accident occurred
involving two vehicles: a 1982 Buick Regal (the "Buick") driven
by Lori Habish and another driven by Amie Przybyla.

R. 3.

Lori

Habish did not own the Buick, but was driving it with her
father's permission.

R. 86. Amie Przybyla sustained serious

injuries and sued Lori Habish and her father, Jack Habish
("Habish"), in the Third District Court for recovery of her
damages.
R. 3.

Przybyla v. Lori Habish. et. al.. Civil No. C86 4893.

Allstate insured Habish and settled the claim for

$100,000.

R. 3-4.

Allstate brought this action to recover the

$100,000 from Liberty.

R. 2-6.

Jockey International, Inc. ("Jockey") employs several
salespersons.

To assist its salespersons in their employment,

Jockey leases vehicles for their use.

R. 42, 249, 581. Jockey

leases the vehicles from Wheels, Inc. ("Wheels").
249.

R. 42, 80,

Jockey has been leasing vehicles from Wheels since at least

November 24, 1971 pursuant to a written lease1.

R. 80, 101-04.

During the leasehold term, the vehicles were owned and titled in
the name of Wheels.

R. 42, 80. Jockey never acquired an

]

The lease was originally entered into between Wheels, Inc.
and Jockey's predecessor, Cooper's, Inc. R. 495-96.
jr.jockey.apelbref.joc
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ownership interest in the vehicles.

Id.

insured the vehicles leased by Jockey.

In 1985, Liberty

R. 42. Liberty's policy

covered the vehicles only during the term of the lease.

Id.

Allstate insured Wheels in 1985. R. 178, 249.
The vehicles leased by Jockey vary in age and are
replaced periodically at differing times.

Since 1971, a practice

has developed by which Jockey's employees may purchase from
Wheels an old leased vehicle when a new replacement vehicle is
provided.

R. 42, 574, 583-84.

A replacement vehicle is

delivered to a local dealership and picked up by the respective
Jockey employee.

R. 252, 317. The replacement vehicle is used

by Jockey's employee for Jockey's business. R. 252.

If the

employee does not intend to purchase the old leased vehicle, it
is left at the local dealership for return to Wheels.
318, 537, 539, 611-12.

R. 252,

If Jockey's employee intends to purchase

the old leased vehicle, it is retained by the employee for his
personal use.

R. 252-53.

Jockey employed Habish from approximately 1963 to 1986.
R. 389-90.
R. 80.
Habish.

In October 1981, Wheels leased the Buick to Jockey.

Sometime prior to 1985, the Buick was delivered to
R. 43, 390.

From October 1981 to sometime after April

4, 1985, Wheels owned legal title to the Buick.

R. 42, 81.

Jockey never acquired an ownership interest in the Buick.

Id.

In or before February 1985, Jockey notified Habish it
would lease and provide him with a new vehicle to replace the
Buick and Habish notified Jockey he wanted to purchase the Buick
jr.jockey.apelbref.joc
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from Wheels.

R. 400-02. On March 11, 1985, a 1985 Mercury

Marquis (the "Mercury") was delivered to Habish for his use as a
salesman for Jockey, to replace the Buick.

R. 43, 81. Habish

retained possession of the Buick, but did not use the Buick in
his employment with Jockey after March 11, 1985.

R. 447, 449-50.

From March 11, 1985 to April 4, 1985, the Buick was used only for
the Habish7s personal use.

R. 414-16, 447, 449-50. At all times

after March 11, 1985, Habish used only the Mercury in his
employment with Jockey.

R. 400-01, 447, 449-50.

Paragraph 2 of the lease between Jockey and Wheels
states in pertinent part:
Lessee's Payments. Lessee agrees to pay to the Lessor,
the full monthly rental for the month in which the
vehicle is delivered if delivery is accomplished on or
before the 15th day of the month, and in advance for
each month for each motor vehicle delivered under the
within lease. No billing will be made for the month of
delivery in the event the vehicle is delivered after
the 15th of that month. If the lease of a vehicle is
terminated on or before the 15th of the month, no
charge will be made for that month, however, if the
lease of the vehicles is terminated after the 15th of
the month, a full month will be billed for the month of
termination.
R. 101.

Paragraph 12 states in pertinent part:

"For billing

purposes, the effective date of termination of a lease of a motor
vehicle, shall be the delivery date of a replacement vehicle
. . . ."

R. 102. Thus, pursuant to those terms, the lease on

the Buick terminated for billing purposes on March 11, 1985.
Because the Mercury had been delivered on March 11, 1985, Wheels
billed Jockey on the Mercury for the entire month of March and

jr.jockey.apelbref.joc
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thereafter.

R. 328, 602. Wheels did not require payment on the

Buick after February 1985. R. 327-28, 598-601.
The terms for the purchase of the Buick were
established when the Mercury was delivered on March 11, 1985. On
March 23, 1985, Habish obtained funds to purchase the Buick in
full.

R. 419.

On about that same day, he tendered the funds to

Wheels by mail to purchase the Buick.

Id.

After tendering the

funds to Wheels, Habish believed the Buick was his own vehicle
and understood he needed to obtain personal insurance coverage on
the Buick.

R. 414, 430, 447-48.

Thus, on March 28, 1985, he

obtained an oral binder of personal insurance coverage from
Allstate on the Buick which became effective on March 29, 1985,
six days before the accident.

R. 140-41, 397-98.

Wheels

received Habish's funds on March 29, 1985. R. 81. At the time
of the accident, Wheels and Habish were waiting for the new
Certificate of Title to be issued.

R. 3, 81. The new

Certificate transferred legal title from Wheels to Habish, but
only after the accident.

R. 86.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This is a declaratory judgment action to determine
insurance coverage between Liberty and Allstate.

Based on the

undisputed facts, the trial court concluded Liberty's insured did
not possess an insurable interest in the Buick on the date of
loss.

Thus, the trial court determined Allstate was solely

responsible to provide coverage, not Liberty.
decision was correct and should be affirmed.

jr.jockey.apelbref.joc
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The trial court's

To enforce an insurance contract, the named insured
must possess an insurable interest when the policy is issued and
when a loss occurs.

Kingston v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co.,

578 P.2d 1278, 1279-80 (Utah 1978); American Mutual Fire
Insurance Co. v. Passmore, 275 S.C. 618, 274 S.E.2d 416, 417
(S.C. 1981).

Jockey did not possess an insurable interest in the

Buick on April 4, 1985, the date of the accident.

Although

Jockey previously possessed a leasehold interest, the lease
terminated on March 11, 1985. Jockey never possessed legal
title.

Jockey never had physical possession of the Buick and

relinquished legal control on March 11, 1985.

Jockey had no

potential legal liability to Amie Przybyla for Lori Habish's
operation of the Buick.

Thus, Liberty is not responsible for

Przybyla's losses.
Allstate's insureds, Wheels and Habish, possessed an
insurable interest in the Buick on April 4, 1985.

Wheels

possessed legal title and Habish possessed equitable title.
Habish had physical possession of the Buick.

As the legal title

holder, Wheels had legal control and Habish had physical control.
Wheels gave Habish permission to use the Buick at his discretion.
Habish gave Lori Habish permission to drive the Buick.

Wheels

and Habish possessed potential legal liability to Amie Przybyla
for Lori Habish7s operation of the Buick.
solely responsible for Przybyla's losses.

jr.jockey.apelbref.joc
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Thus, Allstate is

ARGUMENT
POINT I
JOCKEY DID NOT POSSESS AN INSURABLE INTEREST
This is an action to determine the insurance coverage
responsibilities between Allstate and Liberty.
solely on "ownership."

Allstate

focuses

Allstate argues its insured, Habish, did

not possess "legal title" to the Buick, so it should not be
responsible for the loss.

Appellant's Brief, at 6-8.

Allstate

completely ignores that legal title was possessed by its other
insured, Wheels. Allstate then argues Jockey has "ownership
responsibilities" under its lease with Wheels and therefore
Jockey's insurer, Liberty, must pay the loss.

Id. at 8-15.

"Ownership" is not the issue.
To insure the Buick, Jockey had to possess an insurable
interest in it.

Kingston v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 578

P.2d 1278, 1279-80 (Utah 1978); Hill v. Safeco Ins. Co., 22 Utah
2d 96, 448 P.2d 915, 916 (1969).

"[0]ne who has no interest in

property cannot insure it." National Farmers Union Property and
Casualty Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 249, 252 (1955).
Automobile liability insurance must also be supported by an
insurable interest.

American Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v.

Passmore, 275 S.C. 618, 274 S.E.2d 416, 417 (1981).

See also,

Bendall v. Home Indemnity Co., 286 Ala. 146, 150, 238 So.2d 177,
180 (1970); 3 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, § 24:160, at
261 (2d ed. 1984).

An insurable interest must exist when the

insurance policy is issued and when a loss occurs.

jr.jockey.apelbref.joc
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Kingston, 578

P.2d at 1279.

The Utah Supreme Court defined "insurable

interest" in Hill;

"'Generally speaking, a person has an

insurable interest in property whenever he would profit by or
gain some advantage by its continued existence and suffer some
loss or disadvantage by its destruction. . . . , M

448 P.2d at

916, n. 2 (quoting Couch on Insurance, 2d, Sec. 24.13 (Anderson
1960)).

The Utah Supreme Court has also defined what does not

constitute an insurable interest.
We agree that such an interest would not exist if it
were based solely upon an agreement that an owner (such
as Hardy) would permit another (such as Thompson) to
insure the owner's (Hardy's) property for the benefit
of the latter (Thompson) unless the latter had some
interest in the property other than the right to
recover if it were destroyed by fire. Such an
agreement would permit one having no interest in the
property except a potential gain from its destruction
to gamble upon its loss and would be against public
policy. It is unquestionably true that the party
insuring must have some interest beyond this.
Thompson. 286 P.2d at 252. The dispositive issue then is who had
an insurable interest in the Buick on April 4, 1985.
A.

Jockey Did Not Possess A Leasehold Interest.
Allstate's sole contention is that Wheels' lease

imposed "ownership responsibilities" on Jockey which included the
duty to insure the Buick.

Appellant's Brief, at 8-10.

Allstate

admits Liberty has no liability if the lease terminated before
the accident.

Id. at 8-9.

The pivotal issue then is when did

the lease on the Buick terminate.

Based on the undisputed facts,

the trial court drew the legal conclusion that "the date that
Jockey surrendered the vehicle to Habish for purchase from Wheels
Inc. is the date the lease terminated."
jr.jockey.apelbref.joc
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R. 179. Allstate is not

challenging any of the undisputed facts, only the trial court's
legal conclusion.2

Allstate contends the trial court should

have concluded the lease remained in effect until legal title
passed from Wheels to Habish after April 4, 1985.

Appellant's

Brief, at 8-10.
Allstate contends when the lease terminated is a legal
question because the lease between Wheels and Jockey is
unambiguous.

Id. at 9.

Liberty agrees the question of

termination is one of law, but not only because the lease is
unambiguous.

Liberty agrees the lease is not ambiguous, but it

does not define when termination occurs. While some of the
lease's terms are helpful, the lease does not completely answer
the question.
The trial court's determination that the lease
terminated when Jockey surrendered the Buick to Habish for
purchase from Wheels is a legal conclusion.
If a determination concerns whether the evidence
showed that something occurred or existed, it is
properly labeled a finding of fact, but if a
determination is made by a process of legal reasoning
from, or of interpretation of the legal significance
of, the evidentiary facts, it is a conclusion of law.
2

In oral argument before the trial court, Allstate conceded
"the only testimony that we're going to get in this case is
already in the depositions." R. 265. Without specifying any
factual disputes, Allstate also conceded thcit any alleged dispute
would not preclude the trial court from deciding the legal issues
in the case. R. 266-67. Allstate then declined the opportunity
to have an evidentiary hearing and agreed to have the trial court
resolve the matter based on the facts as stated by Liberty. R.
266-68. In its appeal brief, Allstate has not challenged any of
Liberty's facts. In fact, Allstate often relies on the statement
of facts in Liberty's original memorandum in support of its
motion for summary judgment. Appellant's Brief, at 2-3.
jr.jockey.apelbref.joc
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Moulden & Sons, Inc. v. Osaka Landscaping & Nursery, Inc.. 21
Wash. App. 194, 584 P.2d 968, 970 n. 5 (1978)(citation omitted).
The trial court,s determination was drawn from its interpretation
of the legal significance of the undisputed evidentiary facts.
Thus, it is a legal conclusion.

When the material facts are

undisputed, the determination of their legal effect is a question
of law.

See e.g., DeMontiney v. Desert Manor Convalescent

Center, Inc., 144 Ariz. 21, 695 P.2d 270, 273-74 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1984)("While the question of whether an employment relationship
is one of master and servant or principal and independent
contractor is generally one of fact for the jury . . . where the
evidence is clear and uncontradicted the question is one of law
and should be decided by the court.11); United States Leasing
Corp. v. duPont, 70 Cal. Rptr. 393, 444 P.2d 65, 75 (Cal.
1968)("where, as here, the existence of liability depends upon
the interpretation of written instruments in the light of
uncontradicted extrinsic evidence, the question is properly one
of law . . . . " ) ; Evans v. Bredow, 95 Ga. App. 488, 98 S.E.2d
115, 117 (1957)("In view of the uncontradicted evidence the
question of title became one of law for the court to
determine.").

Thus, this Court must determine if the legal

conclusion drawn by the trial court from the undisputed facts was
correct.
Allstate contends the language of the lease requires a
different conclusion by the trial court.
paragraphs in the lease:
jr.jockey.apelbref.joc

Allstate relies on six

ff 1, 4, 5, 11, 12 and 2.
11

Id. at 9-10.

Paragraphs 1 and 4 give Jockey the right to possess a leased
vehicle "during the term of the lease," but do not define the
"term of the lease."

Paragraphs 5 and 11 provide that Jockey

will perform repairs and maintain liability insurance on a leased
vehicle "during the term of the lease," but do not define the
"term of the lease."

Paragraph 12 provides that Jockey will

return leased vehicles upon termination of the lease, but does
not define when the lease terminates.

Paragraph 12 also provides

the lease terminates for billing purposes when a replacement
vehicle is delivered, but does not specify when termination
occurs for other purposes.

Paragraph 2 outlines an

administrative billing procedure, but does not define termination
of the lease for all purposes.
address this case.

None of those paragraphs directly

Nor do any other provisions in the lease.

Allstate ignores the business practice which developed
between Wheels and Jockey outside the lease.

Periodically and at

differing times, Jockey replaces the vehicles issued to its
employees.

A replacement vehicle is delivered to a local

dealership and picked up by the respective Jockey employee.

R.

252, 317. The replacement vehicle is used by Jockey's employee
for Jockey's business.

R. 252.

If the employee does not intend

to purchase the old leased vehicle, it is left at the local
dealership for Wheels. R. 252, 318, 537, 539, 611-12.

If

Jockey's employee intends to purchase the old leased vehicle, it
is retained by the employee for his personal use.

R. 252-53.

The lease does not address that practice or Wheels' and Jockey's
jr.jockey.apelbref.joc
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respective insurance responsibilities between the time when the
employee receives the replacement vehicle and assumes control of
the replaced vehicle and when the purchase of the replaced
vehicle is completed and legal title passes from Wheels to the
employee.
The trial court's conclusion is supported by the
undisputed material facts.

They are:

The replacement vehicle,

the Mercury, was delivered to and received by Habish on March 11,
1985.

R. 43, 81. After that date, Habish used only the Mercury

for Jockey business.

R. 400-01, 447, 449-50. After March 11,

1985, Habish retained the Buick only for personal use.

R. 414-

16, 447, 449-50. Habish considered the Buick his when he sent
the purchase funds to Wheels on about March 23, 1985.

R. 414.

Prior to the accident, Habish understood he needed to obtain
personal insurance coverage.

R. 430, 447-48. Habish did not

permit the Buick to be driven until after he had obtained
personal insurance coverage.

R. 397, 449-50. Habish obtained

personal insurance coverage from Allstate which became effective
on March 29, 1985, six days prior to the accident.
397-98.

R. 140-41,

The lease on the Mercury began on March 11, 1985, when

it was delivered to Habish, not when legal title to the Buick was
transferred to Habish.
The most enlightening indication of when the lease
terminated is found in the billing treatment given by Wheels to
the Buick.

jr.jockey.apelbref.joc

Pursuant to paragraph 12 of the lease, the lease on
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the Buick terminated for billing purposes on March 11, 19853.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of the lease, Wheels billed Jockey on the
Mercury for the entire month of March and thereafter because the
Mercury had been delivered on March 11, 1985. R. 328, 602.
Wheels did not require any further lease payments on the Buick
after February 28, 1985. R. 327-28, 598-601.

If the lease had

not terminated, Wheels would have required payment on the Buick
from Jockey for March and April 1985.

Because the lease

terminated before the accident, Jockey's insurable leasehold
interest in the Buick also expired.
B.

Jockey Did Not Possess Any other Insurable Interest.
1.

Jockey did not possess any ownership interest.—It

is undisputed that Jockey did not possess any ownership interest
in the Buick at any time. Jerold L. Mullane ("Mullane"), the
Director of Corporate Risk Management/Insurance for Jockey, and
Ford G. Pearson ("Pearson"), Executive Vice President of Wheels,
testified that Jockey never acquired any ownership interest in
any of the vehicles leased by Jockey from Wheels, including the
Buick.

R. 41-43, 79-81.

Allstate admitted in its complaint, in

oral argument and most recently, in its brief that Jockey did not
own the Buick on April 4, 1985. R. 3, 263; Appellant's Brief, at
2-3.

3

Allstate contends Liberty relies on paragraph 12 to
establish the lease terminated on March 11, 1985 for all
purposes. Appellant's Brief, at 11. Allstate uses 3 and 1/2
pages quoting excerpts from Mullane's deposition to show that
Liberty's alleged position is incorrect. Id. at 12-15. Liberty
has never asserted that paragraph 12 controls termination for all
purposes. That paragraph and the other undisputed facts, merely
support the conclusion drawn by the trial court.
jr.jockey.apeIbref.joc
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2.

Jockey did not have possession or control.—It is

undisputed that Jockey never had physical possession of the
Jockey leased the Buick for Habish7s use, R. 80. The

Buick.

Buick was delivered to Habish.

R. 43, 390. Habish used the

Buick in his employment with Jockey, but retained physical
possession at all times from October 1981 to at least April 4,
1985.

R. 383-489.
Jockey had legal control over the Buick from 1981 to

March 11, 1985, but relinquished control on that date. Jockey
leased the Mercury to replace the Buick.

R. 43, 81. On March

11, 1985, the Mercury was delivered to Habish to be used in his
employment.

Id.

Because of Habish7s expressed interest in

purchasing the Buick, he retained physical possession of and
assumed all control over it for his personal use. At that time,
Jockey relinquished all control over the Buick.
to use the Buick as he pleased.

R. 130-31.

Habish was free

Lori Habish was

driving the Buick on April 4, 1985 pursuant to her father's
permission.

R. 86. Jockey could not compel Habish to return it,

limit his use of it or direct its disposition.
3.

Jockey had no risk of legal liability to third

parties.—The insurable interest required to enforce an
automobile liability policy is different than the interest
required to enforce policies involving property loss.

Bendall,

238 So.2d at 180. Automobile liability policies protect the
insured against legal liability for injuries to third parties
caused by the ownership or use of the covered automobile.
jr.jockey.apeIbref.joc
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Id. at

181.

Thus, the courts addressing this issue generally hold the

existence of an insurable interest turns on whether the insured
may be liable for damages sustained by third parties because of
the automobile's use.

See e.g., Passmore. 274 S.E.2d at 417-18;

Rea v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 15 N.C. App. 620, 190 S.E.2d
708, 713 (1972).

One court characterized the requisite interest

as whether "the 'assured' has such abiding interest in the use of
the car in his business that he may become legally liable to
others for injuries resulting from its operation . . . ."

Id.

(quoting Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v» Bear, 125 So. 676,
679 (Ala. 1929).

If not, there is no insurable interest.

See

e.g., Bendall, 238 So.2d 177; Employers Liability Assurance Corp.
v. Swett. 95 N.H. 31, 57 A.2d 157 (1948); Passmore. 274 S.E.2d
416.
In determining an insured's potential liability, the
courts have focused primarily on the named insured's control over
or right to control the use of the automobile.

See e.g..

Bendall. 238 So.2d 177; Swett. 57 A.2d 157; Passmore. 274 S.E.2d
416.

In Bendall, Swett and Passmore. the courts each held the

named insured had to possess an insurable interest in an
automobile liability policy.

238 So.2d at 180; 57 A.2d at 160;

274 S.E.2d at 417. Each held or relied on prior case law that
held the requisite insurable interest depends on the named
insured's potential legal liability to third parties for damages
sustained from the use of an automobile allegedly covered by the
liability policy.

jr.jockey.apelbref.joc
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at 417-18.

Each found no potential legal liability because the

named insured had no control over the use of the vehicle.

238

So.2d at 179-82; 57 A.2d at 157, 159; 274 S.E.2d at 417-18. Each
held no insurable interest existed.

238 So.2d at 181-82; 57 A.2d

at 160; 274 S.E.2d at 418.
Galati v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 381 S.W.2d 5,
(Mo. Ct. App. 1964) is the closest case factually on point to
this case.

In Galati, Sam Galati leased a Chevrolet vehicle from

Manchester Lend-Lease Co.
the leasehold term.

Manchester retained legal title during

Id. at 6.

The lease granted Galati an

option to purchase the Chevrolet at any time.

The lease required

Galati to obtain collision coverage which he did.
named Galati and Manchester.

The policy

A few months later, Galati's aunt,

Mrs. Deblasi, expressed her interest in purchasing the Chevrolet
from Manchester.

Galati and Deblasi went to Manchester and told

Manchester Deblasi was purchasing the vehicle.

Id. Deblasi paid

the purchase price in full, signed some documents and was told by
Manchester she would eventually receive the certificate of title.
Id. at 6-7.

Then, Galati drove Deblasi home, gave her his only

set of keys and Deblasi took possession of the Chevrolet.
7.

Id. at

At that time, Galati considered the Chevrolet Deblasi's car.

Two days later, Deblasi was involved in an accident.

Deblasi

received the certificate of title approximately two weeks later.
Galati7s policy was never assigned to Deblasi.
Galati sought to enforce the collision policy against
his insurer.
jr.jockey.apelbref.joc

The lower court ruled in Galati's favor and the St.
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Louis Court of Appeals reversed.

The court of appeals held an

"insured must have an interest of some kind in the subject matter
of the insurance. . . . [0]therwise the contract would become a
gambling contract and void."

Id. at 9 (citation omitted).

The

court further held that once "the insured parts with his interest
in the insured property he stands as though he had never had any
right in it, and from that moment forward his policy is void as a
mere wagering contract."

Id.

The court found Galati had two

interests under the lease: the right to possession and use of the
car and the right to purchase it.

The transfer of those rights

was complete two days before the accident.

Despite Manchester's

failure to deliver the certificate of title before the accident,
Deblasi had "acquired all the rights [Galati] had.

There was no

way thereafter that he could '* * * suffer a loss from its
destruction. * * *'"

Galati "was no longer '* * * exposed to the

danger of the loss against which he was indemnified * * *.,n

Id.

Although Galati did not involve a liability policy, its
facts would have also compelled the Missouri court to find no
insurable interest in that context.

Missouri follows the general

rule that to enforce a liability policy the named insured must
have an insurable interest.
80 (Mo. 1959).

Hall v. Weston, 323 S.W.2d 673, 679-

Missouri also follows the general rule that an

insurable interest exists if the insured is legally liable to
third parties injured because of the vehicle,s operation.
Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 605 S.W.2d 125, 127 (Mo. 1980).
jr.jockey.apelbref.joc
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At the time of the accident, Manchester still possessed title to
the Chevrolet.
Chevrolet.

Deblasi had paid Manchester in full for the

Galati transferred possession of and control over the

Chevrolet to Deblasi for her personal use.
to be Deblasi7s.

Galati considered it

Galati had transferred and Deblasi had obtained

"all the rights [Galati] had" before the accident.

Galati would

have had no legal liability to any third parties injured because
of Deblasi7s operation of the Chevrolet.
This case is factually identical to Galati.
possessed legal title.
full for the Buick.

Wheels

R. 42, 81. Habish had paid Wheels in

R. 81, 419. Jockey transferred possession

and all control to Habish before the accident for his personal
use.

Habish considered the Buick his and understood he needed

personal insurance.

R. 414, 430, 447-48.

After March 11, 1985,

not only did Habish not use the Buick in his employment, but also
he did not permit its use for any purpose until he had obtained
personal insurance coverage.

R. 397, 449-50.

need Jockey's permission to use the car.

In fact Jockey, did not

have power to give or withhold permission.
713.

Habish did not

Rea, 190 S.E.2d at

Lori Habish was operating the Buick for her personal use

and by her father's permission.

R. 86. Thus, Jockey had no

legal liability to Przybyla and therefore no insurable interest
in the liability policy.

jr.jockey.apelbref.joc
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POINT II
WHEELS AND HABISH HAD AN INSURABLE INTEREST
A.

Allstate's Insureds Had An Ownership Interest,
It is undisputed that Allstate's insured, Wheels,

possessed legal title to the Buick at all times before and on
April 4, 1985. Mullane and Pearson testified Wheels possessed
legal title to the Buick before and on April 4, 1985. R. 41-43,
79-81.

Allstate has never disputed that testimony.

In fact,

Allstate admits in its Statement of Facts that Wheels possessed
legal title until sometime after April 4, 1985.

Appellant's

Brief, at 2-3.
Although Allstate7s other insured, Habish, did not
obtain legal title until after the accident, he possessed
equitable title to the Buick on April 4, 1985.

In February 1985,

Habish expressed his desire to purchase the Buick.

R. 400-02.

By approximately March 23, 1985, Habish acquired and sent to
Wheels the funds to purchase the Buick.

R. 419. Wheels received

the funds by March 29, 1985. R. 81. By April 4, 1985, Habish
had completed all the terms of the purchase and Wheels and Habish
were merely waiting for Utah to issue a new certificate of title.
R. 3, 81, 86.

Thus, equitable title had passed to Habish.

The transfer of equitable title despite the failure to
effectuate the transfer of a new certificate of title was
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Dahl v. Prince, 119 Utah
556, 230 P.2d 328 (1951).
name of Garn.
jr.jockey.apelbref.joc

In Dahl, a Buick was registered in the

Id. at 329. The G a m s purchased a truck from Dahl
20

and traded the Buick to Dahl as part payment for the truck.
did not obtain a new certificate of title.

Dahl

Subsequently, the

G a m s 7 creditor, C. G. Green, obtained a writ of attachment and
had the writ levied on the Buick.

Green argued he was entitled

to the Buick because Dahl had not effected transfer of title.
Id.

Green relied on Utah Code Ann. § 57-3a-72 (1943)4.

330.

Id. at

The Utah Supreme Court stated section 57-3a-72 governed the

transfer of legal title only and not equitable title.

The Court

further stated the statute implied equitable title transferred to
a bona fide purchaser.

Id.

The Court held the purchase between

the Garns and Dahl was complete and equitable title had passed.
Id. at 330-31.

The transfer of equitable title has been

recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in other cases.

See Hall v.

Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983)("In a uniform real estate
contract . . . the vendor usually retains legal title and passes
equitable title to the purchaser."

Id. at 227); First Security

Bank of Utah, N. A. v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d 24, 504 P.2d 995
(1972)(The recipient of a stock gift obtains equitable title
notwithstanding the donor's failure to endorse the stock
certificates.

Id. at 996); Mosbv Irrigation Co. v. Criddle, 11

Utah 2d 41, 354 P.2d 848 (1960)(Notice to the owner of equitable
title to application for appropriation of water was proper.
at 851-52).

4

Section 57-3a-72 is the predecessor to section 41-1-72.
Allstate relies on section 41-1-72.
jr.jockey.apelbref.joc
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Id.

B.

Allstate's Insureds Had Possession And Control.
It is undisputed that Habish physically possessed the

Buick from 1981 to at least April 4, 1985.

It cannot be disputed

that Habish exercised control over the Buick from March 11, 1985
to April 4, 1985. Habish retained possession of the Buick after
March 11, 1985 for his personal use.
for his employment.

He drove only the Mercury

He did not permit anyone to drive the Buick

until he had obtained personal insurance coverage.

Once insured

on March 29, 1985, Habish gave permission to his daughter to
drive the Buick.
disposition.

Habish had a right to direct the Buick's

Furthermore, it cannot be disputed that Wheels had

some right to control the Buick from March 11, 1985 to April 4,
1985.

Transfer of legal title had not been completed.

If Habish

had failed to meet any of the terms of the purchase, Wheels would
have been entitled to demand return of the Buick.
C

Only Allstate's Insureds Had An Insurable Interest.
Based on Hill's definition of an "'insurable interest,"

only Habish and Wheels had an insurable interest on April 4,
1985.

Jockey's interest in the Buick ceased on March 11, 1985.

Wheels delivered the Mercury to Habish as a replacement for the
Buick.
use.

Habish retained possession of the Buick for his personal

The Buick was no longer available to Jockey for its use or

the use of its employees.

Habish's responsibilities to Jockey

were no longer dependent on his use of the Buick.

Habish

possessed the Mercury to perform his job responsibilities.
Jockey no longer controlled the Buick's disposition.

jr.jockey.apelbref.joc

22

Jockey

could not profit by or gain any advantage by the Buick's
continued existence.

Jockey could not suffer any loss or

disadvantage by its destruction.

If the Buick had been stolen,

damaged or destroyed, Jockey's business interests would not have
been affected.

Jockey could not have claimed a taxable loss or

recover any insurance proceeds.
Wheels and Habish, however, stood to gain from the
vehicle's continued existence and risked a loss by its
destruction.

"'Any interest in property, legal or equitable,

qualified, conditional, contingent, or absolute, or merely the
right to use the property, with or without the payment of rent,
is sufficient.'"

Hill, 448 P.2d at 916, n. 2 (emphasis added).

Other courts have held equitable title is a sufficient insurable
interest.

See e.g., Cherry v. Cherry, 343 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Okla.

1959) ; Snodcrrass v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co..
15 Kan. App. 2d 153, 804 P.2d 1012, 1017-18 (1991).

The Oklahoma

Supreme Court stated:
'As soon as any interest in property vests in the
vendee, he has an insurable interest therein, as in the
case of a vendee under an executory contract of
purchase which operates to vest in him an equitable
title to the property. . . . It is not material that
the legal title to the property has not passed to the
vendee, who has paid part of the purchase price; and
the insurable interest of the vendee is not defeated by
the fact that the contract of purchase is unenforceable
under the statute of frauds, * * * The destruction of
property is a real loss to the person in possession,
who claims title under an executory contract of
purchase, and neither the fact that he owes the
purchase money nor the contingency that his title may
be defeated by his inability subsequently to perform
the conditions of his contract defeats the existence of
an insurable interest in him. * * *'
jr.jockey.apelbref.joc
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Cherry, 343 P.2d at 1069 (citation omitted).

Habish had

equitable title and his insurer was responsible.

Because Wheels'

legal title had not transferred to Habish, Wheels' insurer was
responsible for the loss too.

State Farm Mutual Insurance

Company v. Holt. 28 Utah 2d 426, 503 P.2d 1205 (1972).

In

addition, to the extent Habish defaulted on the purchase, Wheels
also controlled disposition of the vehicle.

Wheels had an

interest in preserving the Buick's value until legal title was
transferred in case it had to retrieve the vehicle.
Finally, Wheels and Habish were exposed to legal
liability to Przybyla.

Because Wheels owned legal title, Habish

was using the Buick pursuant to Wheels' permission.

Only the

legal title holder or someone with the right to possess and
control the vehicle can give permission.

Rea, 190 S.E.2d at 713.

Habish controlled the use of the Buick and gave Lori Habish
permission to use it for her personal use.

Both then faced

potential legal liability for Lori Habish's operation of the
vehicle.

Allstate covered both.

Only Allstate was responsible

for Przybyla's damages.
POINT III
HABISH CANNOT NOT ENFORCE WHEELS' LEASE AGAINST JOCKEY
Assuming arguendo the lease between Wheels and Jockey
did not terminate before the accident, it cannot serve as a basis
for compelling enforcement of Liberty's policy.

Allstate's sole

argument is that Jockey had a contractual obligation to insure
the Buick until legal title passed to Habish.
jr jockey apelbref joe
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Appellant's Brief,

at 8-10.
lease.

That alleged contractual obligation arises from the

Habish is not a party to the lease. Wheels is not a

party to the action.

There is no claim or evidence that Wheels7

rights under the lease were assigned to Habish.

Any contractual

obligation to insure the Buick was owed to Wheels and Habish has
no standing to enforce it.
POINT IV
ALLSTATE'S RELIANCE ON HOLT IS MISPLACED
Allstate's reliance on State Farm Mutual Insurance
Company v. Holt. 28 Utah 2d 426, 503 P.2d 1205 (1972) is
misplaced.

In Holt, Yazzie was purchasing a vehicle from his

employer who possessed legal title to the vehicle.

Yazzie7s

employer, Holt, retained legal title to the vehicle pending full
payment by Yazzie.

Before full payment was made and, therefore,

before legal title was transferred from Holt to Yazzie, the
vehicle was involved in an accident.

The Supreme Court held that

because Holt possessed an insurable interest at the time of the
accident, as the legal title holder, Holt's insurer was liable.
Holt does not require Liberty to pay.

At all times

prior to the accident, Wheels possessed legal title to the Buick.
Prior to the accident, Habish had paid Wheels in full to purchase
the Buick and was waiting to have legal title transferred from
Wheels to Habish.

On the date of the accident, legal title

remained in Wheels and Habish possessed equitable title.

Thus,

Holt requires Allstate to pay as either Wheels7 insurer or
Habish's insurer, but not Liberty.
jr.jockey.apelbref.joc
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POINT V
UTAH LAW DID NOT REQUIRE JOCKEY TO INSURE THE BUICK
Allstate contends that Utah law required Jockey to
insure the Buick until legal title transferred.
Brief, at 10-11.

Appellant's

Allstate further contends it is illegal for

Jockey to operate the Buick without liability insurance.

Id.

From March 11, 1985 to April 4, 1985, Jockey was not operating
the Buick.

The Buick was controlled by Habish and operated by

Habish or his daughter only for their personal use and only after
he had obtained personal liaility coverage from Allstate on March
29, 1985. Any duty to insure arising out of ownership in the
Buick belongs to either Wheels as the legal title owner or Habish
as the equitable owner, but not Jockey.
CONCLUSION
Absent an insurable interest in the Buick, Jockey
cannot insure it. Although Jockey previously possessed an
insurable interest, Jockey relinquished any interest it had on
March 11, 1985.

Thus, on April 4, 1985, the date of the

accident, Jockey did not possess any insurable interest in the
Buick.

However, Allstate's insureds, Wheels and Habish, did.

The trial court's Order granting Liberty's motion for summary
judgment and denying Allstate relief was correct.

Thus, Liberty

requests that this Court affirm the trial court's decision.
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DATED:

December

/

1992.

MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.

0 1 ^

lansen
'Jeffre^^obinson
Attorneys for Liberty Mutual
Insurance Group
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Attorneys for Allstate
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Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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MAY 2 6 1992

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,

CIVIL NO.

Plaintiff,

890900412

vs.
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE
GROUP, and TRAVELERS INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants.

The Court heard the Summary Judgment Motion of defendant
Liberty Mutual Insurance Group and plaintiff's cross Motion for
Summary

Judgment

on

May

11,

1992.

The

Court

argument and read the Memoranda filed herein.

heard

oral

The Court now

enters its ruling.
The undisputed facts are:
1.

Allstate was Wheels Inc. insurer.

2.

Wheels

Inc.

was

the

titled

owner

of

the

Buick

automobile leased to Jockey.
3.

Jockey's employees used the leased vehicles.

4.

Jack Habish was an employee of Jockey.

01

PAGE TWO

ALLSTATE V. LIBERTY MUTUAL

5.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Mr. Habish made arrangements to purchase the

Buick

automobile furnished to him by Jockey from Wheels Inc., the
title holder.
6.

Jockey surrendered the Buick to Mr. Habish so that he

could purchase the Buick from Wheels Inc.
7.
Wheels

Habish
Inc.

and

negotiated
caused

the

purchase

the vehicle

to

of

the

Buick

be

covered

by

from
his

insurance policy.
8.

Prior to the time that Wheels Inc. caused title to be

transferred

to Habish, Habish's daughter, while driving

the

vehicle, was involved in an accident.
9.

As a result of the accident, Allstate

satisfied

a

claim against Habish's daughter for $100,000.00.
10.

Jockey, as a lessee, maintained insurance coverage on

the vehicles leased from Wheels Inc.
The issue presented to the Court was whether or not the
Buick was covered by Jockey's insurance carrier, Liberty, until
such time as title was transferred to Habish.
The Court concluded that the date that Jockey surrendered
the vehicle to Habish for purchase from Wheels Inc. is the date
the lease terminated.

When Wheels Inc. agreed

to sell the

vehicle to Habish, which was before the date of the accident,
Wheels Inc. and Habish were responsible for insurance coverage
on the Buick.

ALLSTATE V. LIBERTY MUTUAL

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The critical issue in this case is the date of surrender of
the Buick for sale and not the transfer of title.

Jockey was

required to maintain insurance only for so long as it had a
leasehold interest in the vehicle.

Once Jockey gave up the

leasehold interest by surrendering the Buick for sale by the
lessor,

its

obligation

for

insurance

coverage

terminated.

Transfer of title effected only the relationship between Habish
and Wheels, Inc.
Plaintiff's Motion to partially strike the Affidavits of
Jerald L. Mullane and Ford G. Pearson is granted.
The Motion of defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Group for
Summary Judgment is granted and plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment is denied.
Dated this 2> 6 day of May, 1992.

\ JOHN A. ROKICH
'-©ISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the
this

J-7

foregoing Memorandum

Decision,

day of May, 1992:

L. Rich Humpherys
Lee C. Henning
Attorneys for Plaintiff
175 S. West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Royal I. Hansen
Jeffrey Robinson
Attorneys for Defendant Liberty Mutual
15 East 100 South, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1915
Paul S. Felt
John A. Adams
Attorneys for Defendant Travelers
79 S. Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385

to the

following,

TabB

JUN 1 8 1992

Royal I. Hansen (No 1346), and
Jeffrey Robinson (No. 4129), of
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.
600 Deseret Plaza
No. 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1915
Telephone: (801) 521-0250

Depij»/CierK

Attorneys for Liberty Mutual Insurance Group
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

v.
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE
GROUP and TRAVELERS INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants.

Civil No. C-89-0900412
Judge John A. Rokich

Oral argument was heard on Liberty Mutual Insurance
Group's Motion for Summary Judgment and Allstate Insurance
Company's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and motion to
partially strike the Affidavits of Jerold L. Mullane and Ford G,
Pearson.

After oral argument, the Court took the matter under

advisement.
Decision.

On May 26, 1992, the Court issued a Memorandum
Based on the parties' oral argument, the legal

memoranda, the record on file, the Court's Memorandum Decision,
and good cause appearing therefore,
m b jr order.joc
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IT IS ORDERED that:
1.

Liberty Mutual Insurance Group's Motion for

Summary Judgment is granted and plaintiff's Complaint against
Liberty Mutual Insurance Group is dismissed with prejudice.
2.

Allstate Insurance Company's Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment is denied.
3.

Allstate Insurance Company's motion to partially

strike the Affidavits of Jerold L. Mullane and Ford G. Pearson is
granted.
DATED:

June /§

, 1992.
BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

4*

day of June, 1992, a

copy of the Order was mailed to:
L. Rich Humpherys, Esq.
Lee C. Henning, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
510 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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